SHIPWRECKS
OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY
© Copyright 2003-2005, Northern Atlantic Dive Expeditions, Inc.
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NORTHERN VOYAGER
Soundings magazine, March 2004
Type: Factory fishing ship
LOA: 144' Construction: Steel Date of Loss: November 2, 1997 Reason: Foundered during sea trials Depth of Water: 180 fsw History: On the morning of November 2, 1997, the Northern Voyager, a 144-foot fishing vessel, was proceeding a few miles off the coast of Gloucester, Massachusetts when crewmen discovered water flooding a compartment in the ship's stern. The flooding, which resulted when the starboard rudder dropped out of the vessel, was severe and the crew immediately began trying to pump out the water. Despite the crew's best efforts, the water level in the compartment continued to rise, threatening to flood the boat's engine room. If the engine room flooded, all of the Northern Voyager's electrical pumps and generators located inside would be rendered useless. The situation was such that the master of the Northern Voyager, Captain David Haggerty, radioed Coast Guard Station Gloucester, told them that "[w]ater [was] coming in fast," and requested that they "get some pumps out to [the ship]." To complicate matters, a storm had passed through the area the night before, leaving swells of roughly six to eight feet. Station Gloucester (under the command of Chief Warrant Officer Wesley Dittes) responded immediately by launching a 41-foot boat, to be followed shortly thereafter by a 47-foot one. The Coast Guard also diverted a 110-foot cutter, the ADAK, to assist as On Scene Coordinator. Coast Guard Group Boston, which is organizationally superior to Station Gloucester, assumed the role of Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator. The 41-footer arrived on the scene at approximately 9:15 a.m. and immediately evacuated eight crew members who apparently requested to leave the Northern Voyager, leaving on board of the original crew Captain Haggerty, the engineer, and the first mate. Two Coast Guardsmen, Petty Officers Adam Sirois and Brian Conners, boarded the Northern Voyager and attempted to assist in continuing efforts to remove water from the ship using extra pumps supplied by the Coast Guard. Although what was done slowed the rate of water accumulation, the flooding continued and the Northern Voyager began to develop a port side list. As the Northern Voyager rolled and began to list, Coast Guard Officer Dittes (aboard the 47-footer), Group Boston, and the On Scene Coordinator began discussing the possibility that the vessel would need to be evacuated. Several factors worried Dittes. His most immediate concern was that the vessel's port side tilt made both access to and escape from the Northern Voyager more difficult. This is because the fishing boat's only access port, a door from the shelter deck through which the crew boarded and departed from the boat, was on the starboard side. As the fishing boat tilted more and more to port, the starboard side was raised higher and higher off the surface of the water. No less worrisome was his concern about progressive flooding, which was causing the vessel to settle further in the water, with the danger that the boat would capsize without warning before it sank, trapping anyone aboard before they could be rescued. Based upon these concerns, Dittes's conversations with Northern Voyager crew members who had already boarded the 47-footer, and the continual progression of the flooding, Dittes ordered his men to evacuate the Northern Voyager's remaining crew members. Captain Haggerty opposed the Coast Guard's decision to evacuate his vessel and wanted to talk about other options for pumping and salvage, including commercial salvage. Dittes and Conners refused to discuss any other options for salvage aboard the Northern Voyager, and, again, ordered Haggerty and his men off the boat. According to Captain Haggerty, Conners informed him that if he did not cooperate, the Coast Guard would "subdue [him] physically" in order to take him off the Northern Voyager. All Coast Guard personnel and the remaining Northern Voyager officers were then transferred to the Coast Guard 47-footer. The Northern Voyager was abandoned at 10:27 a.m., continued to sink, and capsized at 11:22 a.m., fifty-five minutes after the last person left the vessel. Captain Haggerty did not want to stay around and watch the boat sink. Accordingly, shortly after the evacuation, the Coast Guard 47-footer headed back to Station Gloucester with Captain Haggerty and the remaining members of his crew on board. According to plaintiffs' experts, there were various steps that Captain Haggerty and his senior crew could have taken to stabilize the situation if the Coast Guard had permitted them to stay on the vessel. These steps included shutting certain doors and making them watertight so that the flooding was confined to two compartments in the stern of the boat. If these steps had been taken, plaintiffs' experts asserted, the vessel could have floated for at least another twenty hours even assuming that no pumping capacity was brought to bear. This would have provided ample time for independent salvage resources to reach the vessel, even if they had to come from as far away as Boston.
The USCG was sued by the owners and underwriters
of the Northern Voyager for ordering the crew off the vessel and prohibiting a
commercial salvor from aiding the stricken vessel, which ultimately led to
it's sinking. The owners of the Northern Voyager also absorbed a
$300,000 cost to remove bunker oil trapped in the vessel. The court
found in favor of the Coast Guard, citing the sea conditions posed significant
risk to human safety, that the Coast Guard acted in the best interest of
human safety and that they were not responsible for the vessel itself.
The decision was appealed, arguing that the Coast Guard should be liable for damages
due to negligence. The claim was that the USCG was not intervening
in a situation considered to be a life-threatening emergency (the Northern Voyager
was reported to have a functioning powerplant at the time the evacuation order
was given). However, in a decision that set new precedent, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the U.S. Coast Guard acted appropriately,
within its discretionary powers in curtailing salvage efforts and removing the
vessel's officers from their ship. A brief was filed with the U.S. Supreme
Court to grant a writ of Certiorari and hear the case. The case is still
ongoing as of June 2004. An article discussing the case, published in
Soundings in March 2004, can be found here.
Additional information on legal activities
surrounding the Northern Voyager sinking can be found here:
The full PDF file detailing the US Court of
Appeals opinion, November 26, 2003 can be found here:
The sinking of the Northern Voyager is also
discussed in a novel describing the 1996 sinking of the Heather Lynn II and
the USCG's role in a failed rescue that lead to the deaths of three crewmen:
Original news bulletin reporting the sinking of
the Northern Voyager:
"Thirteen rescued as fishing vessel sinks off
Massachusetts The Northern Voyager (U.S.-registry 44.5-meter/146-foot long
fishing vessel homeported at Portland, Maine) sank at 1230 2 Nov. about 5.6
kilometers/3.5 miles southeast of Gloucester, Mass. All 13 crewmembers were
rescued by a 14-meter/47-foot lifeboat from U.S. Coast Guard Station
Gloucester after a distress call was received at 0900. The Coast Guard's
"Island"-class Patrol Boat U.S.C.G.C. Adak (WPB 1333) and a
12-meter/41-foot utility boat from Station Gloucester also responded. Coast
Guard personnel and Northern Voyager crewmembers worked to stop the flooding
but the pumps were overwhelmed. The Northern Voyager is owned by James Odlin
of Portland and operated by David Haggerty of Brunswick, Maine."
Diving the Northern Voyager:
Today, the Northern Voyager lies in 180 ft of water 3.5 miles southeast of Gloucester. The Northern Voyager is one of the two deeper wrecks off Cape Ann, the other
being the bow section of the Poling. In this area there are often strong
tidal currents, although the visibility tends to be good. The wreck lies
3/4 turtled on its starboard rail and can be reached in
about 155 ft of water. Although a tight squeeze, the
interior can be penetrated by entering from the sand level. Both propellers
are still on the wreck (they appear to be steel not bronze). The wreck
is totally intact, which makes it a strange sight since most wrecks have
damage to the hull. Each year, more and more growth appears on the hull,
although it is still relatively clean with letters and paint clearly
visible. The wreck has little to no monofiliment or hang ups on it,
which makes it tempting for novice tech divers. But its awkward angle
and depth can be disorienting when swimming the hull.
Visibility averages 20-30' and currents vary from moderate to strong.
Photos:
The following photos are courtesy diver John
Mitchell
The name still clearly visible along the hull
(l) and above a scupper (r)
A door leading to the interior (l) and the
registration numbers (r)
More coming soon!
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